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The Optimal Allocation of Ownership Right in Sequential
Production Stage along the Global Value Chains
Yang Liu1
Business School, East China University of Political Science and Law, 201620, Shanghai, China
Abstract: In this document, we have developed a model to analyze the optimal allocation of ownership right in sequential
production stage along the global value chains. We have shown that, when the demand elasticity is low (high) relative to the
degree of substitution among inputs in sequential production, and the bargaining weight of firm is low (high), integration
(outsourcing) is the optimal organizational structure. And when both the demand elasticity is high (low) relative to the
degree of substitution among inputs and the bargaining weight of firm is low(high), the firm will find it optimal to
outsource(integrate) relatively upstream inputs, while to integrate(outsource) relatively the most downstream inputs.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
Most production processes are sequential in nature. First raw materials are converted into basic inputs,

which are next combined with other inputs to produce more complicated inputs, before themselves being
assembled into final goods. The focus of this document is to analyze the optimal make-or buy decision of firms
along the sequential production chain.
McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) develop a simple model to analyze the make-or-buy
decision of firms. In these documents, final goods firms find outsource more attractive in a thicker market in
which there are more suppliers of intermediate goods. And similarly, suppliers of intermediate goods find it
more attractive to operate in a thicker market in which there are more final goods firms

[1, 2]

. McLaren (2000)

indicates that in autarky equilibrium, integration is only equilibrium structure in a small economy, and there is
no room for outsource. While in a large economy integration and outsource can co-exist. Grossman and
Helpman (2002) indicates that under outsourcing mode, specialized supplier can produce intermediate goods at
lower cost but final good producer that outsourcing the intermediate goods has to face the costs of searching for
a supplier that will deliver the agreed quality and quantity of intermediate goods. Searching cost is related to the
probability of final good producer marching with a supplier successfully. And the probability is related to the
thickness of the market. This means in a thicker (e.g. larger) market, the probability that a final good producer
finds the qualified supplier is higher. Meanwhile in a thicker market, if the supplier fails to deliver, it is easier
for the outsourcing firm to find an alternative solution. Therefore, outsourcing is more likely to succeed, in the
larger industry and in the larger overall economy. Therefore firms in larger industries and in larger economies
prefer outsourcing. Common drawback of their models is that both of them assume that matches between final
goods firms and suppliers of intermediate goods are random.
Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2005) propose a model which assumes that relationship-specific investment
of supplier is related to the technological proximity between the supplier of intermediate goods and the final
goods firms. The thicker the market is, the higher the intensity of suppliers’ dispersion and technological
proximity is which reduces the risks of hold-up problem of suppliers. They highlight the complementarity
between entry of the final goods firms and the entry of intermediate goods suppliers. Meantime, they extend the
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model into the north-south framework and conclude that as the expansion of south market, firms located in the
North Country prefer outsource to the south country [3, 4].
Quality of the institutional framework is another important factor in determining whether to integrate or
outsource. Because the contract between the final goods producer and the supplier of intermediate goods is
incomplete, the higher the quality of the institutional framework is, the lower the risks of hold-up which suffered
by supplier are. Nunn (2005) proposes a simple model in which the relative requirement of contract-dependent
components varies across sectors. In his model, better contracting institutions reduce costs in sectors with a
larger need for intermediate goods relatively more than in sectors with less need for intermediates goods[5].
Antràs and Helpman(2007) construct a model with heterogeneous firms, and show that better institutional
framework for contracting in the south country increase the likelihood of outsourcing[6].
Empirical evidence also supports theoretical predictions above. Nunn(2007) using U.S. data shows that
countries with higher quality of legal system specialize in industries that rely heavily on relationship-specific
investment. Levchenko(2007) using US imports data for 1998, shows that the quality of institutional framework
is the source of comparative advantage. In particular, countries with higher quality of institutions have a
comparative advantage in goods with a complex production process. And he examines that the share of US
imports in goods with complex production processes increase by 0.23 when the quality of institutions increases
from bottom 15% to top75% [7].
Antràs(2003) using US imports data finds that capital intensive intermediate goods are imported through
intra-firm trade, while labor intensive goods are imported through arm’s-length trade. And the share of intra-firm
imports is related to the ratio of capital to labor in US
and concludes that

[8]

. Antràs(2004) constructs a general equilibrium model

firms in capital intensive sector prefer vertical integration, while firms in labor intensive

sectors prefer outsourcing[9]. Similarly, Nunn and Trefler(2008) finds that the intra-firm trade is higher in
skill-intensive and capital-intensive sectors

[10]

. Antràs and Helpman(2004) proposes two new concepts of

intensity of sector which are headquarter intensive sectors and component intensive sectors. In component
intensive sectors, final goods producers should offer suppliers a higher incentive to constrain the
under-investment of suppliers and reduce the distortion of incomplete contract; therefore outsourcing is a
preferable form. In headquarter intensive sectors, final goods producers should have higher residual control
rights and choose the vertical integration form. Antràs (2005) extends this model by incorporating theory
product life cycle. He assumes that the intensity of component increase according to the maturity of product.
And he concludes that as final goods are becoming mature, more and more firms prefer outsourcing [11].
Antràs and Helpman(2004) show how firms’ decisions to integrate or outsource vary with the productivity of
firms. In their model, the trade-off between vertical integration and outsourcing is driven by the trade-off
between hold-up problem-related cost and the fixed costs of the particular type of organization. Specifically,
because they assume that fixed costs of vertical integration are dominantly higher than fixed costs of
outsourcing and that offshoring has higher fixed costs than inshoring, in headquarter intensive sector, vertical
integration and outsourcing co-exist and in decreasing order of productivity, the most productive firms will
choose international integration(FDI), firms with a medium-high level of productivity will international
outsourcing, firms with medium-low level of productivity will choose domestic integration, the least productive
firms will choose inshoring outsourcing.
Since 1990, fragmentation of production has been internationalizing and networking. Technological
innovations in communication and transportation have lowered coordination cost and transportation cost, which
has enabled an historic break-up of the production process by allowing firms to specialize in production of
specific tasks or different production stages in disparate locations. GVCs offer countries opportunities to
integrate into the world economy at lower cost and gain from it. As the international fragmentation of
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production has become increasingly pronounced, the implications of such sequential production for the working
of open-economy general equilibrium models have been widely explored in the international economics
literature, such as Kremer(1993),Kohler(2004),and Costinot, Vogel and Wang(2011), Yi(2003), Harms, Lorz and
Urban(2012), and Baldwin and Venables(2010).[12-17]
Upstreamness proposed by Antràs, P., Chor, D., Fally, T., and Hillbery, R.(2012), refers to the weighted
distance of a stage of production from final-good production [18]. Fally(2012) and Antràs, Chor and Fally(2012)
propose the measurement of upstreamness of a country or an industry in GVCs

[19]

. Fally(2012) defines

upstreamness of industry i as N i  1   ij N j ,where ij is the value of inputs from industry j used to
j
produce one dollar of goods in industry i. Antràs et al.(2012) describes the upstreamness of industry i as
 N d ij Fj
 N  N d ikd kj Fj
 N  N  N d ild lkd kj Fj
F
U i  1  i  2  j 1
 3  j 1 k 1
 4  j 1 k 1 l 1
 ..., where
Yi
Yi
Yi
Yi

dij is the dollar amount of industry i’s output needed to produce one dollar worth of industry j’s output.

Fi is the

sum value of output use as a final good. Yi is the value of gross output of industry i. these two measures appear
distinct, but they are in fact equivalent (Antràs et al., 2012). Based on the measure of upstreamness, Antràs and
Chor(2013) develops a property-right model incorporating the analysis on organizational structure of firms into
GVCs. Their model shows that the incentive to integrate suppliers varies systematically with the relative
position in GVCs. Furthermore, they conclude that when the demand faced by the final goods producer is
sufficiently elastic, there is an only one threshold production stages such that all stages prior to this stage are
outsourced, while all stages after that are integrated. While when demand is inelastic, it is optimal for the firms
located in relatively upstream stages to integrate, and for firms located in relative downstream stages to
outsource [20].
In this document, we develop a model to analyze the optimal allocation of ownership right in sequential
production stage along the global value chains. We analyze four cases, which are useful supplements to Antràs
and Chor (2012).
2.

BENCHMARK MODEL
There is one final good which is differentiated in the eyes of consumers and belongs to monopolistically

competitive industry with heterogeneous firms, each producing a differentiated variety. Consumer preferences
over the industry’s varieties feature a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) so that the demand faced by the
firm in question can be represented by

y  Ap 1 /(1 )

(1)

where A  0 is real total expenditure of consumers on final varieties, and the firm takes as given.





 

And 1 / 1 -  ,   0,1 is the demand elasticity and is common for all firms in the final goods sector.

 

Obtaining the final goods require sequential production stages. These stages are indexed by i  0,n , with



a larger i corresponding to a stage closer to the finished good. Denoting x i

the value of the intermediate

inputs that the supplier of stage i delivers to the firm, production function of final good is given by
1/ 

y    0n x i  di 




(2)

where  is productivity of final-good producer.  is a parameter that captures the degree of substitutability
among the stage inputs, and we define that 0    1 which represents technological substitution
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relationship among the stage inputs. We assume that for all i , x i
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is customized to make it compatible with

the needs of a firm who controls a final good. Combing demand function with production function, the revenue
obtained by firm is given by
/

r  A1     0n x  i di 


(3)



We assume that each supplier undertake one stage of input production and a relationship-specific investment in
order to produce a customized input. Firm should contract with the supplier. Following Grossman and Hart
(1986), the terms of exchange between the firm and the supplier cannot be set in stone before the customized
inputs are produced, the actual payment to a particular supplier is negotiated only after the input has been
produced and delivered. The ex post bargaining is modeled as a Nash Bargaining game in which the firm obtains


 ,     V ,O  . Following the property rights approach, we assume that ex post bargaining takes place

a share   of the incremental contribution that accrues to the firms in its bargaining with supplier
both under outsourcing (O) and under integration (V), and V  O . Incompatible inputs can be produced by
firm itself at a negligible cost, but they add no value to the final good. Based on (1) and (2), the accumulative
revenue of intermediate input at stage  is
/

r    A1    0 x i  di 




(4)

So the incremental contribution to total revenue generated by the supplier at stage  is






 
r  
 1  

r   

A 
r    x  





The marginal revenue r  

(5)

at stage  depends on the total demand level A, demand elasticity parameter  ,



production substitutability among stages  , accumulative revenue r 

and the value of intermediate input at

 

stage  . Notice that in the ex post bargaining, the firm gets a share    V ,O



 



supplier at stage  gets 1 -   . The supplier at stage  decide to produce x 





of r   , while the

by maximizing his profit

which is defined by






 


s    1     A1     r    x    cx  


(6)

Which delivers
1 /1   
 

1   /  
1   

A 


x     1    
r  

c







To plug ea. (7) into ea. (5) to obtain







(7)
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 1
1  
 
 


 1 -  

A


1 -   1 -  
r   
r  


c





(8)



By solving this differential equation above, we have r  and plug it into (7)
 -

1 / 1

 1 -    1 -     

 
x    A 
1 -  
c 

  / 1   1    

1 / 1   
 0



1   i 

 / 1 

di 

    /  1   


(9)



According to (9), we can see that outsourcing increases x  , and the effect of accumulative outsourcing



structure on x 

depends on relative relationship between  and  . If    , the accumulative





outsourcing structure increases x  , while if    , the accumulative outsourcing structure depresses x  .

3.

OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF OWNERSHIP RIGHT
The firm will choose the optimal allocation of ownership right at each stage by maximize his profit. The

firm’s profit is given by

 F  r  0n 1   i r i di

(10)

Plugging (3) and (5) into (10) to obtain

F  A




1   


1   

    / 1 

 /1 

 


 c 



 /1  0i 1   j  /1  dj 

n
0  i 1   i 

    /  1 

di

(11)



The firm chooses the optimal   , by maximizing  F at stage  . The partial derivative of  F with respect to

   can be expressed as
 F
2 -1 /1  F    G  
 1 -   
  
where   A 


 -







(12)
 

   
 /1      1    ，
 1     1-      1-  ,    1- , F    
1   1 k
dk 


 

1 -    0
1   
c 




 

 

and


1
  
 /1      1   
n
j
G    
dj 
dj
  j 1   j 1   0 1   k 


1   1   



 2 -1 /1  

Because  1 -  

.

 0 , whether the incentive for the firm to retain a larger surplus share



increases or decreases along the value chain hinges on the relative sizes of the parameters   ,

 and  .
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Then we will discuss following four cases (the fifth case have been discussed in Antràs and Chor, 2012 ), see
table 1.
3.1 PREVALENCE OF INTEGRATION
When 1    V and    , which means

 F
 0 , for stage  , the larger  
  



is, the greater

 F is(see case1 in table 1). Under this circumstance, integration is optimal organizational structure at stage  .
Intuitively, when  is small relative to  , outsourcing is particularly costly, because high investments reduce
incentives to invest for downstream suppliers, while the firm captures a disproportionate amount of surplus by



integrating. If the bargaining weight  

was common for all stages along the value chain, the optimal

structure along the whole value chain is integration.
Table 1. Four cases analysis
CASE
CASE 1

conditions

   and V  1  

CASE 2

   and O  1  

CASE 3

   and V  1  

CASE 4

   and O  1  



The optimal  

The Optimal Allocation of Ownership Right

  

F

is increasing in

F

is decreasing in  



 *   is increasing function of 

 *  is decreasing function of 

prevalence of integration

prevalence of outsourcing

0，~ outsourcing; ~，n  integration
0，ˆintegration; ˆ，n outsourcing

3.2 PREVALENCE OF OUTSOURCING
When 1    O and    , which means

 F
 0 , for stage  , the smaller  
  



is, the greater

 F is. Under this circumstance, outsourcing is optimal organizational structure at stage  . Intuitively, when

 is high relative to  , integration is particularly costly; because this reduces the incentive to invest of
suppliers, although integration allows the firm to capture a disproportionate amount of surplus, the incremental



surplus over which the firm and the supplier negotiate is particularly small. If the bargaining weight  

was

common for all stages along the value chain, the optimal structure along the whole value chain is outsourcing.



3.3 THE OPTIMAL SHARE OF THE INCREMENTAL PROFIT  
Setting

IS INCREASING IN M

 F
*
 0 , for stage  , there is the optimal division of surplus, which we denote by   . Then
  



we can have
 
 


1 
 *    1 -  -     n  j 1   j 1    j 1   k  /1   dj   1    dj  /  0 1   k   /1  dk   1 

 1    
 
 0








(13)
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When    , it is clear that the numerator in (13) is decreasing in  , while the denominator is increasing in  .



Due to the negative sign in front of the ratio,  *  is increasing function of  . That means the more close to
the downstream stage; the optimal division of surplus to firm is greater (see Figure 1). Remember
that V  O , if V  1   , then there is a unique threshold ~ , all production stages prior to ~ are
outsourced; and all stages after ~ are integrated. That means firm will find it optimal to outsource relatively
upstream inputs, while to integrate relatively the most downstream inputs.

 *  

 *  

V
O
1 

1-

1 

V
O
~

0
Figure 1

n



ˆ

0

n



Figure 2



3.4 THE OPTIMAL SHARE OF THE INCREMENTAL PROFIT  

IS DECREASING IN M



When    ,  *  is decreasing function of  . That means the more close to the downstream stage; the
optimal division of surplus to firm is smaller (see Figure 2). If O  1   , then there is a unique threshold ˆ ,
all production stages prior to ˆ are integrated; and all stages after ˆ are outsourced. That means firm will
find it optimal to integrate relatively upstream inputs, while to outsource relatively the most downstream inputs.
4.

CONCLUSIONS
In this document, we have developed a model to analyze the optimal allocation of ownership right in

sequential production stage along the global value chains. We have shown that, for a particular stage, the firm’s
make-or-buy decision depends on the magnitude of the consumer demand elasticity  , the degree of substitution
between inputs in sequential production  and the bargaining weight of firm( V and O ). When the demand
elasticity is low relative to the degree of substitution among inputs in sequential production, and the bargaining
weight of firm is low, integration is the optimal organizational structure for whole value chains. When the
demand elasticity is high relative to the degree of substitution among inputs in sequential production, and the
bargaining weight of firm is high, outsourcing is the optimal organizational structure, for whole value chains.
When the demand elasticity is high relative to the degree of substitution among inputs in sequential production,
and the bargaining weight of firm is low, firm tend to outsource inputs at upstream stages, and to integrate
inputs at downstream stages. When the demand elasticity is low relative to the degree of substitution among
inputs in sequential production, and the bargaining weight of firm is high, firm tend to integrate inputs at
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upstream stages, and to outsource inputs at downstream stages.
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